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THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL REALITY OF CALIFORNIA'S
THREE STRIKES LAW: EWING V. CALIFORNIA AND THE
NARROWING OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT'S
PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE
INTRODUCTION
For the first time in Ewing v. California,' the United States Supreme
Court addressed the constitutionality of California's three strikes law.
Despite the controversial 25-year-to-life sentence given to Gary Albert
Ewing for shoplifting three golf clubs, the Court rejected his claim that
the length of his sentence was "grossly disproportionate," and, thus,
"cruel and unusual," under the Eighth Amendment.2 In fact, the Court's
5-4 decision confirms the proposition, first promulgated in Rummel v.
Estelle,3 that "[o]utside the context of capital punishment, successful
challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been ex-
ceedingly rare. ' 4
California's three strikes law aims to punish repeat criminal offend-
ers by "ensur[ing] longer prison sentences and greater punishment for
those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of seri-
ous and/or violent felony offenses."5 Although voters originally intended
to put "'rapists, murderers and child molesters behind bars where they
belong, '"'6 in practice, non-violent and non-serious offenders make up the
majority of those sentenced under three strikes.7 Consequently, questions
and concerns regarding the proportionality of repeat offenders' sentences
have emerged in the shadows of the three strikes law.
This Comment analyzes California's heavily debated three strikes
law and the Supreme Court's decision in Ewing. Part I offers a brief syn-
opsis of the facts surrounding the Ewing case. Part H addresses the ori-
gins of three strikes, provides an overview of the law's key provisions,
and examines the jurisprudence surrounding the proportionality of non-
capital sentences under the Eighth Amendment. Part III is an in-depth
look at the Court's plurality decision, which affirmed the indeterminate
1. 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
2. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30-3 1.
3. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
4. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272.
5. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 667(b) (West 2003).
6. Autumn D. McCullough, Three Strikes and You're in (For Life): An Analysis of the Cali-
fornia Three Strikes Law as Applied to Convictions for Misdemeanor Conduct, 24 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 277, 280 (2002) (citing CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET, GEN. ELECTION 5 (Nov. 8, 1994), available
at http://holmes.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/1994g.pdf (last visited April 21, 2004)).
7. Id. at 277-81 (citing Carl Ingram, Serious Crime Falls in State's Major Cities, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 1996, at A3).
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life sentence in Ewing. Part IV argues that the Ewing plurality's ex-
tremely narrow threshold test stopped short of applying the fundamental
principle of the "'evolving standards of decency' 8 to Ewing's three
strikes sentence and, thus, missed the mark in resolving the proportional-
ity debate. Part IV also addresses the plurality's ruling that any reform of
the law should be left to the legislature, by examining the plausibility of
such reform, as well as the social and economic arguments for revising
three strikes. Finally, the Comment concludes that the California legisla-
ture should accept the Ewing Court's challenge and limit the law's appli-
cation to only serious and violent crimes: a solution that would not only
alleviate the economic and social burdens of three strikes, but would also
ultimately silence the controversy surrounding California's divisive re-
cidivist statute.
I. FACTS OF EWING V. CALIFORNIA
On March 12, 2000, only ten months after being paroled from a
nine-year prison term, Gary Ewing limped out of a pro shop in El Se-
gundo, California in an attempt to hide three golf clubs in his pants leg.9
Suspicious of Ewing, a shop employee notified the police, who subse-
quently arrested Ewing for theft in the golf course's parking lot.'0 The
value of the three clubs totaled approximately $1,197." As a result of his
actions, the State convicted Ewing of "one count of felony grand theft of
personal property in excess of $400."
'12
Ewing's criminal history dated back to 1984, when he pleaded
guilty to theft at the age of twenty-two.' 3 Between 1988 and September
1993, Ewing's "rap sheet" continued to grow. In particular, Ewing
served time for a variety of offenses, including thefts, battery, burglary,
and trespassing.' 4 On December 9, 1993, Ewing was arrested and later
convicted of "first-degree robbery and three counts of residential bur-
glary," of an apartment complex in California. 15 In 1999, after serving
approximately six years of a nine-year sentence, Ewing once again faced
the wrath of California's criminal justice system for stealing the three
golf clubs. 16
Given Ewing's four prior strikes for the three burglaries and the
robbery, Ewing desperately tried to avoid the harsh consequences of
California's three strikes law. Specifically, during his sentencing hearing
8. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958)).
9. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 17-18 (2003).
10. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18.
11. See id.
12. Id. at 19 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 484 (West. Supp. 2002); § 489 (West 1999)).
13. Id. at 18.
14. Id. at 18-19.
15. Id. at 19.
16. Id.
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for stealing the clubs, Ewing asked the court to reduce his grand theft
conviction to a misdemeanor under California's "wobbler" law.17 Ewing
also asked the trial court to use its discretion and "dismiss ... some or all
of his prior serious or violent felony convictions ... ." ,8 However, Ew-
ing's pleas went unanswered. Instead, the trial court sentenced Ewing to
25-years-to-life under the three strikes law.19
On appeal, Ewing raised an Eighth Amendment argument contend-
ing that his sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime of shop-
lifting three golf clubs.20 Yet, the California Court of Appeals disre-
garded Ewing's claim, and affirmed his conviction. 2' The court justified
Ewing's sentence pointing to "the legitimate goal [of the three strikes
law] of deterring 'repeat offenders .... The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia followed suit and declined to review Ewing's case.23 Finally, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the constitu-
tionality of Ewing's sentence. 24
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Birth of the Three Strikes Law
California's three strikes law was the culmination of public and po-
litical concerns over the need for penological reform. 5 Following the
murder of Kimber Reynolds by a parolee, Reynolds's father called on
state officials to sponsor a measure directed towards incarcerating repeat
offenders.26 In response to his cries, Assembly Bill 971 emerged. 27 Mike
Reynolds's extremely broad proposal endorsed substantial sentencing
enhancements for a second felony, allowed a non-violent criminal history
to necessitate a 25-year-to-life sentence, and accepted any felony in Cali-
17. Id. A "wobbler" is an offense that can be charged as either a misdemeanor or a felony at
the court's discretion. Id. at 16-17. Grand theft is a "wobbler" despite the defendant's prior record.
Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 489(b) (West 1999). Conversely, other crimes, which are
typically categorized as misdemeanors, become "wobblers" because of the defendant's prior record.
Id. at 1183 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 490 (West 1999); § 666 (2002)). If a court uses its
discretion to lower a felony, such as grand theft, to a misdemeanor, a three strikes punishment can be
avoided. Id.
18. Id. at 19.
19. Id. at 20. Ewing will not be eligible for parole for at least 25 years. Brief of Amici Curiae
Families Against Mandatory Minimums at 10, Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179 (2003) (No. 01-
6978).
20. People v. Ewing, No. B 143745, 2001 WL 1840666, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2001).
21. Ewing, No. B143745, 2001 WL 1840666, at *3.
22. Id. at *4.
23. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20.
24. Id.
25. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND
YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 3-6 (2001).
26. Bill Jones, Why the Three Strikes Law Is Working in California, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 23, 23 (1999).
27. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 15 (2003).
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fornia's penal system for the third strike.28 Despite bipartisan support, the
Assembly Committee on Public Safety defeated the bill soon after its
introduction.29
By the beginning of 1994, five new versions of the three strikes leg-
islation resurfaced in reaction to public fury over the kidnapping and
murder of twelve-year-old Californian, Polly Klaas.30 Rather than voting
for one of these alternatives, the California legislature deferred the deci-
sion to Governor Pete Wilson, and announced it would pass any plan the
governor selected. 31 Not surprisingly, Governor Wilson chose a "copy-
cat" version of Reynolds's radical three strikes proposal to support his
"getting tough on crime" campaign.32 Upon the murder conviction of
"career kidnapper," Richard Allen Davis, public support of the three
strikes initiative intensified.33
By January 31, 1994, an amended version of Assembly Bill 971
passed the Assembly, and shortly thereafter, the California Senate, by
considerable margins.34 After Governor Pete Wilson signed the bill into
law in March 1994, voters "overwhelmingly approved [Proposition 184]
by a margin of 72 percent to 28 percent., 35 Ultimately, California en-
acted two codified versions of the three strikes law.36 Following the birth
of three strikes, the broad scope and dramatic effects of the law's unique
provisions became a stark reality.
37
B. Overview of Three Strikes' Statutory Provisions
Three strikes is "designed to increase the prison terms of repeat fel-
ons," 38 by punishing offenders convicted of prior "serious" ' 39 or "vio-
28. See ZLMRING ET AL., supra note 25, at 4. Reynolds's proposed three strikes program was
significantly broader than any other habitual-offender laws being proposed in the nation. Id. For
instance, Washington passed the first habitual-offender law in 1993, which enumerated only select,
serious felonies, with a life sentence on the third conviction. Id. (citing Daniel W. Stiller, Initiative
593: Washington's Voters Go Down Swinging, 30 GoNz. L. REV. 433, 434-35 (1995)).
29. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14, 15.
30. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 25, at 6.
31. Id. By deferring the choice to the governor, the Democratic legislature hoped he would
back down from tough on crime stance or "be politically neutralized if he persisted." Id.
32. Id. The governor rejected a narrow version of three strikes proposed by the California
District Attorneys Association. Id.
33. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 15.
34. Id.
35. Jones, supra note 26, at 24. The passage of Proposition 184 was overshadowed by Propo-
sition 187, which addressed immigration issues in California. See ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 25, at
6.
36. Shannon Thorne, One Strike and You're Out: "Double-Counting" and Dual Use Under-
mines the Purpose of California's Three Strikes Law, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 99, 101 (1999). The two
provisions included: CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 667(b)-(i) (2003) (based on Assembly Bill
971), and 1170.12 (2003) (premised on Proposition 184). Id.
37. See ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 25, at 17-22. For instance, by 1998 California had 40,000
sentences under its three strikes law while none of the other jurisdictions with recidivist statutes had
reached 1,000 convictions. Id. at 20-21.
38. People v. Superior Court (Romero), 917 P.2d 628, 630 (Cal. 1996).
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lent '40 felonies, generally referred to as "prior strikes.' Paramount to
the three strikes law is that both second-time and third-time convicted
criminals receive enhanced sentences. 42 Specifically, an offender with
one prior "serious" and/or "violent" strike must receive a sentence of
"twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony
conviction. 4 3 Under the "third-strike provision," an offender, who has
two or more prior strikes, is sentenced to "an indeterminate term of life
imprisonment," with the minimum term equaling at least twenty-five
years.44
Although an offender's two prior strikes must fall under the defini-
tion of serious and/or violent felonies, the third strike, or "triggering of-
fense," definition includes both non-violent and non-serious felonies.45
The law also allows a "wobbler"-an offense that can be charged as ei-
ther a misdemeanor or felony-to constitute a third strike.4 6 For example,
the "'petty theft with a prior"' statute, "classifies a petty theft as a 'fel-
ony"' if the offender's record contains at least one theft-related convic-
tion.47 As a result, a repeat offender who has committed one prior violent
crime and one prior property-related crime will fall into the "wobbler"
provision if convicted of petty theft.48 On the other hand, a repeat of-
fender with two prior violent crimes, and no history of property-related
crimes, will not be subjected to a three strikes penalty.49
In order to mitigate the ostensible harshness of the law, supporters
of three strikes point to the discretionary dilutions available to prosecu-
tors and judges under California's legal system. First, prosecutors have
an enormous amount of discretion in charging recidivists. 50 Although the
law mandates that prosecutors "shall charge" repeat offenders with a
third strike, in practice, prosecutors can choose to charge a "wobbler" as
39. See CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1192.7(c) (West 2003). Serious offenses include arson,
burglary and assault with a deadly weapon among more than 30 enumerated offenses. Id.
40. See id.§ 667.5. Violent offenses include such crimes as murder, rape, mayhem and child
molestation. Id.
41. Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Did "Three Strikes" Cause the Recent Drop in
California Crime? An Analysis of the California Attorney General's Report, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
101, 102 (1998).
42. See CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 667(e).
43. Id. §§ 667(e)(1), 1170.12 (c)(1). While the first strike must be a serious or violent felony,
the second strike can be either a non-serious or non-violent felony. See Beres & Griffith, supra note
41, at 103.
44. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 667(e)(2)(A) (stating that a minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence is calculated as "the greater of: (i) Three times the term otherwise provided as punishment
for each current felony conviction .... (ii) Imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years. (iii) The
term determined by the court pursuant to Section 1170 for the underlying conviction, including any
enhancement[s] .... ).
45. Beres & Griffith, supra note 41, at 103.
46. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 16.
47. Id. at 50 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 (2002)).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 25, at 26.
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either a felony or misdemeanor and, thus, spare the offender of an en-
hanced three strikes penalty. 51 Second, if an offender faces a third strike
charge, the court may exercise leniency by dismissing prior felonies "in
the furtherance of justice. 52 However, a judge's discretion is restricted
to "proceed[ing] in strict compliance with section 1385(a) [of Califor-
nia's Penal Code], and is subject to review for abuse of discretion. 53
Additionally, the judge must consider whether the defendant falls outside
the spirit of the three strikes law, by examining the offender's back-
ground, the present offense, and the nature of the offender's prior of-
fenses.5 4 Accordingly, a judge's exercise of discretion is substantially
limited in scope and is rarely used.55 Thus, while prosecutors maintain a
substantial influence in determining a repeat offenders' punishment, "the
checks and balances of judicial.., discretion have been removed. 56
Moreover, despite the legal system's alleged safeguards, Califor-
nia's three strikes is still considered "one of the harshest habitual of-
fender laws in the nation. 57 Beyond the fact that any third felony trig-
gers a three strikes penalty, once convicted, the law also precludes re-
lease of offenders for good credit at any time before the minimum term is
served.58 Furthermore, plea bargaining of prior strikes is not allowed, and
out of state, as well as juvenile adjudications, can count as prior strikes.59
Critics of three strikes note that both "dual use," (counting a prior felony
conviction twice), and "double counting," (when a single act constitutes
two strikes), add to the law's inconsistencies. 60 However, the primary
critique of three strikes is that the 25-year-to-life sentence mandated un-
der the law is "grossly disproportionate" to the crime and, consequently,
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.6' In order to fully understand the
Supreme Court's plurality decision in Ewing, an analysis of the Court's
prior decisions regarding the proportionality of non-capital sentences is
imperative. Throughout the Court's lengthy examination of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause over the years, the Court remains divided
on whether the proportionality principle applies to non-capital sentences.
51. See McCullough, supra note 6, at 284.
52. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1385(a) (West 2003) (giving judges the discretion to strike
prior felonies to avoid enhancing a sentence); see also Romero, 917 P.2d. at 632 (recognizing that
judges may use § 1385(a) to impose lesser sentences).
53. Brief of Amicus Curiae for Respondent Leandro Andrade at 6, Lockyer v. Andrade, 123
S.Ct. 1166 (2003) (No. 01-1127) (internal quotations omitted).
54. Id. at 7 (quoting People v. Williams, 17 Cal. 4th 148, 161 (Cal. 1998)).
55. Id. at 2.
56. See ZIMRING Er AL., supra note 25, at 27.
57. See McCullough, supra note 6, at 282 (citing Andrade v. Attorney Gen., 270 F.3d 743
(9th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that only four states, Rhode Island, Texas, West Virginia and Louisiana,
have repeat offender laws that marginally compare to California's three strikes law)).
58. Id. at 283.
59. Id.
60. See Thorne, supra note 36, at 106-16.
61. See McCullough, supra note 6, at 278.
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C. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Regarding Proportionality of Non-
Capital Sentences
The Eighth Amendment demands that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted. 62 For more than a century, the Supreme Court has attempted
the daunting task of determining whether the Eighth Amendment's Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause includes a proportionality principle. 3
In addressing the proportionality question, courts often consider "'the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety. ' '64 Accordingly, the prohibition of grossly disproportionate sen-
tences most frequently appears in death penalty cases due to the egre-
gious nature of the punishment.65 Although successful proportionality
challenges to non-capital sentences are uncommon, the Ewing Court re-
lied on four leading cases, Rummel v. Estelle,66 Hutto v. Davis,67 Solem v.
Helm,68 and Harmelin v. Michigan,69 to address the proportionality of
Ewing's three strikes sentence.
1. Rummel v. Estelle
70
The Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of recidi-
vist statutes for non-capital offenses in Rummel v. Estelle.71 In this 1980
case, the Court concluded that the "length of the sentence actually im-
posed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative. 72 The Court affirmed
a mandatory life sentence with a chance of parole for Rummel's convic-
tion of "obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. 73 Although Rummel
pointed to the absence of violence, the "small amount of money taken,"
and the harshness of Texas's recidivist statute in his argument, the Court
62. U.S. CONST. amend. ViII.
63. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (reasoning that punishment of
cadena temporal, which entailed 15 years of hard labor with chains fastened to the prisoner's wrists
and ankles at all times, constituted cruel and usual punishment); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S.
616 (1912) (rejecting a claim that life imprisonment for horse theft was "cruel and unusual"); Robin-
son v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (finding a 90-day sentence excessive for the crime of being
"addicted to narcotics"); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (suggesting that only "unique"
forms of punishment can violate the Eighth Amendment, and holding that imposing capital punish-
ment for rape of an adult woman was disproportionate).
64. Gregg v. Florida, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958)).
65. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980); see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782 (1982) (holding the death penalty is excessive for felony murder when the defendant did not
take a life, attempt to take a life, or intend that a life be taken).
66. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
67. 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam).
68. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
69. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
70. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
71. Rummel, 445 U.S. 263.
72. Id. at 274.
73. Id. at 265-66. His two prior felonies included fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain
$80.00 and passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36. Id.
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found his pleas unpersuasive. 4 The Court reasoned that "successful chal-
lenges to the proportionality of [non-capital sentences] have been ex-
ceedingly rare, ' 75 and reserved only for extraordinary circumstances.
The Rummel Court further analyzed the constitutionality of Rum-
mel's sentence by comparing the stringency of Texas's recidivist statute
to other states' habitual offender provisions. 77 Ultimately, the Court con-
cluded that, "[a]bsent a constitutionally imposed uniformity inimical to
traditional notions of federalism, some State will always bear the distinc-
tion of treating particular offenders more severely than any other
State., 78 Thus, Texas's comparatively harsh sentencing scheme did not
render Rummel's conviction unconstitutional.79 Rather, the Court con-
cluded that "Texas was entitled to place upon Rummel the onus of one
who is simply unable to bring his conduct within the social norms pre-
scribed by ...the State." 80 Therefore, by deferring the proportionality
question to the legislature and noting the "rarity" of challenges to prison
terms, the opinion did little to answer the question of whether the propor-
tionality principle applies to non-capital cases.
2. Hutto v. Davis
8'
Two years later, the Court in Hutto v. Davis82 continued to evade
the proportionality question and, instead, reiterated Rummel's holding
that courts are "reluctan[t] to review legislatively mandated terms of im-
prisonment., 83 In its per curiam opinion, the Court rejected defendant
Davis's Eighth Amendment challenge to a forty-year sentence and fine
of $20,000 for the possession and distribution of about nine ounces of
84marijuana. In fact, the Court chastised the Fourth Circuit for finding
Davis's sentence unconstitutional and ignoring the Court's decision in
Rummel.85 The Court emphasized that "the basic line-drawing process
[regarding the proportionality of sentences] is 'properly within the prov-
ince of legislatures, not courts.' ''86 Moreover, the Court once again
74. Id. at 275-76.
75. Id. at 272.
76. Id. at 274 n. 1 (noting that Justice Powell's extreme example in the dissent of receiving a
mandatory life sentence for overtime parking constitutes addressing proportionality).
77. Id. at 279-82.
78. Id. at 282.
79. See id. at 281.
80. Id. at 284.
81. 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam).
82. Hutto, 454 U.S. 370.
83. Id. at 374 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274).
84. Id. at 375.
85. Id. at 374-75. The Court noted that the "Court of Appeals could be viewed as having
ignored, consciously or unconsciously, the hierarchy of the federal court system created by the
Constitution and Congress." Id.
86. Id. at 374 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275-76).
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stressed that "'successful challenges to the proportionality of particular
sentences' should be 'exceedingly rare."'
87
3. Solem v. Helm
88
While Rummel and Hutto deferred the proportionality question to
the legislature, the Court in Solem v. Helm8 9 finally suggested that "all
sentences of imprisonment are subject to appellate scrutiny to ensure that
they are 'proportional' ....,90 In affirming the reversal of Helm's life
sentence without parole for uttering a no account check for $100,91 the
Court reasoned that the Eighth Amendment "prohibits not only barbaric
punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime
committed. 92 In response, Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, accused
the majority of "distort[ing] the concept of proportionality of punishment
by tearing it from its moorings in capital cases. 93 Yet, the majority bol-
stered its decision by applying a broad interpretation of Rummel.94 The
Court recognized "that some sentences of imprisonment are so
disproportionate that they violate the Eighth Amendment," 95  and,
therefore, Rummel "should not be read to foreclose proportionality
review of sentences of imprisonment.',
96
The Court in Solem also delineated three objective factors to aid
courts in analyzing a proportionality challenge: "(i) the gravity of the
offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed
for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions., 97 Although
Rummel implied that courts were incapable of impartially judging the
gravity of an offense and severity of a sentence, the Solem Court sug-
gested that courts are in fact competent to make these subjective judg-
ments in an objective manner. 98 Accordingly, courts are justified in pun-
ishing a recidivist more severely. 99 However, the level of harm caused to
society is also weighed in determining the constitutionally permissible
87. Id. (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272).
88. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
89. Solem, 463 U.S. 277
90. Id. at 305. The Court noted that it "do[es] not adopt or imply approval of a general rule of
appellate review of sentences. ... [RIather, in applying the Eighth Amendment the appellate court
decides only whether the sentence under review is within constitutional limits." Id. at 290 n. 16.
91. Id. at 281.
92. Id. at 284.
93. Id. at 304 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justices White, Rehnquist and O'Connor joined the
Chief Justice in his dissent. Id. Ultimately, the dissent accused the majority of ignoring the standard
adopted in both Rummel and Hutto. Id.
94. See id. at 303 n.32. The Court stressed that its decision in Solem was "not inconsistent
with Rummel v. Estelle." Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 292. These are the same factors proposed by Justice Powell in the Rummel dissent.
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 295 (Powell, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 292.
99. Id. at 296.
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degree of harshness in a sentence.'°° Therefore, the Court found that be-
cause Helm's prior convictions were minor and nonviolent, his sentence
was disproportionate to the harm and, thus, unconstitutional.' 0 ' By apply-
ing the proportionality principle to non-capital sentences, the Solem
Court recognized that lengthy prison sentences could indeed constitute
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. However,
despite the Solem Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, dis-
cordance eventually reemerged in the proportionality debate and resulted
in even more confusion.1
0 2
4. Harmelin v. Michigan'
0 3
Because of the conflicting standards in Rummel and Solem, the
Court's recognition of a proportionality principle in the Eighth Amend-
ment remained unclear. Almost ten years later, the Court in Harmelin v.
Michigan attempted to resolve the conflict. The Harmelin Court con-
cluded that its decision in Solem "was simply wrong; the Eighth
Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee."'' 4 Yet, the Court
differed on why Harmelin's proportionality claim failed. 0 5 Justice
Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, affirmed first-time offender
Harmelin's life sentence without parole for possessing 652 grams of co-
caine. 10 6 Unlike Solem, the Court instead concluded that the three-part
test outlined in Solem mistakenly invited judicial subjectivism and, there-
fore, failed to create a workable objective test.10 7 Furthermore, after care-
ful examination of the historical pretexts of the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause, Justice Scalia reasoned that the Eighth Amendment
should be directed at prohibiting the "methods of punishment," rather
than length of sentences. 0 8 Simply put, Justice Scalia drew a bright line
at capital punishment, and refused to extend proportionality review to
non-capital sentences.'°9
Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor
and Souter, invoked a "narrow proportionality principle" in his concur-
rence in Harmelin."10 In contrast to Justice Scalia's "no proportionality
guarantee" for non-capital cases, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the pro-
100. Id. at 292-95.
101. Id. at 303.
102. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23.
103. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
104. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965.
105. Compare id. at 994, with id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
106. Id. at 996.
107. Id. at 986.
108. ld. at 979.
109. See id. at 996.
110. Id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
[Vol. 81:2
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portionality principle does apply to non-capital sentences.' In trying to
make sense of the Court's contradictory standards for reviewing propor-
tionality claims, Justice Kennedy extracted four common principles that
emerged over the years-"the primacy of the legislature, the variety of
legitimate penological schemes, the nature of our federal system, and the
requirement that proportionality review be guided by objective factors,"
such as those delineated in Solen.' 12 However, Justice Kennedy empha-
sized that in applying Solem's objective three-factor test, "intrajurisdic-
tional and interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate only in the rare
case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the
sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.""
3
Overall, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the Eighth Amendment does not
mandate strict proportionality in criminal sentencing, but rather, "forbids
only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the
crime.,,114
In short, Justice Scalia once again maintained that an objective
analysis of non-capital sentences is impossible and, therefore, propor-
tionality reviews should remain with death penalty cases. In contrast,
Justice Kennedy's concurrence, successfully illustrated that an objective
analysis is achievable under his modified version of Solem's objective
test. Following Justice Kennedy's lead, the Ewing Court applied a similar
test to evaluate the propriety of Ewing's sentence under California's
three strikes law.
Notwithstanding this precedent acknowledging a proportionality re-
view of non-capital sentences, the definition of what constitutes an "ex-
treme sentence that is 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime," has re-
mained ambiguous. Within this backdrop, the Supreme Court in Ewing
once again addressed the proportionality principle, but this time shrouded
in the controversy of California's three strikes law.
III. EWING V. CALIFORNIA 15
Following the Court's previous holdings that proportionality re-
views of non-capital cases are "rare," the plurality in Ewing adopted an
exceedingly narrow proportionality standard to apply to recidivists' sen-
tences. 1 6 Specifically, the plurality extended the initial threshold inquiry
111. Id.; see also Hutto, 454 U.S. at 374 n.3 (recognizing the possibility of a proportionality
review); Solem, 463 U.S. 277 (holding life sentence for habitual offender with nonviolent felonies as
unconstitutional and grossly disproportionate).
112. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).
113. Id. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
114. Id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting
Solem, 463 U.S. at 288). The Harnelin dissent is beyond the scope of this Comment because the
Ewing Court focused on Justice Kennedy's concurrence.
115. 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
116. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20.
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to include a repeat offender's entire criminal history. 7 and, thus, made
"gross proportionality" challenges to non-capital cases practically impos-
sible.1' 8 Accordingly, the plurality upheld the constitutionality of Ew-
ing's sentence." 9 Justices Scalia and Thomas, went one step further and
reserved proportionality review to only capital cases.120 Finally, while
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, suggested adopting a broad proportional-
ity principle,1 2' Justice Breyer applied a thorough comparative analysis in
his dissent to Ewing's case and concluded that under the circumstances,
Ewing's sentence was grossly disproportionate and, therefore, unconsti-
tutional.
122
A. The Plurality Opinion: Reforming Harmelin's Narrow Proportionality
Principle to Apply to Non-Capital Cases
In Ewing, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Kennedy, affirmed a 25-year-to-life sentence for three-time of-
fender Ewing. 123 In reaching its decision, the Court relied on the propor-
tionality principles set forth in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Har-
melin.124 Specifically, Justice O'Connor maintained that the "Eighth
Amendment . . .contains a 'narrow proportionality principle' that 'ap-
plies to noncapital sentences."",125 The Court recognized the same four
basic guidelines of proportionality review set out by Justice Kennedy in
Harmelin-'"the primacy of the legislature, the variety of legitimate pe-
nological schemes, the nature of our federal system, and the requirement
that proportionality review be guided by objective factors," similar to
those outlined in Solem.' 26 Accordingly, like Justice Kennedy in Har-
melin, Justice O'Connor reasoned that the Eighth Amendment proscribed
only "extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the
crime.,,127
In applying a "narrow proportionality principle" to Ewing's sen-
tence, Justice O'Connor first addressed the legitimacy of California's
three strikes law. The Court noted that "[t]hough three strikes laws may
117. See id. (noting that the trial court considered Ewing's entire criminal history during sen-
tencing).
118. See id. at 42-43 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the severity of the plurality's threshold
inquiry).
119. Id. at 30-31.
120. Id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
121. Id. at 32-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 42 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 30-31.
124. Id. at 30.
125. Id. at 20 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-97 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
126. Id. at 23 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment)).
127. Id. (quoting Harnelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment)).
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be relatively new, our tradition of deferring to state legislatures in mak-
ing and implementing such important policy decisions is longstand-
ing."'128 The Court reasoned that because "[riecidivism has long been
recognized as a legitimate basis for increased punishment,"' 12 9 California
was justified in "'deterring and segregating habitual [offenders].' 13° In
fact, the Court acknowledged that the State's interest in protecting the
public's safety added to the law's validity. To rationalize its reasoning,
the Court pointed to the decrease in California's crime rate, as well as
evidence indicating that more parolees have left California since the in-
ception of the three strikes law. 13' The Court reiterated that any criticism
of three strikes should be directed at the legislature, and emphasized that
"[the Supreme Court] do[es] not sit as a 'superlegislature' to second-
guess [the State's] policy choices.'1
32
In addressing Ewing's constitutional challenge, the Court first con-
ducted a threshold analysis of "the gravity of the offense compared to the
harshness of the penalty," as summarized in Justice Kennedy's concur-
rence in Harmelin.133 The Court noted the Supreme Court of California's
recognition of the "'seriousness' of grand theft in the context of propor-
tionality review."' 134 Accordingly, the Court opined that "[e]ven standing
alone, Ewing's theft should not be taken lightly."'
' 35
Notwithstanding the "seriousness" of Ewing's triggering offense,
the Court also considered Ewing's prior crimes when balancing the grav-
ity of the offense against the harshness of the penalty. 136 Unlike Solem
and Harmelin, where the Court only measured the proportionality of the
offender's current crime, 137 Justice O'Connor stated that "[i]n weighing
the gravity of Ewing's offense, we [also] must place on the scales... his
long history of felony recidivism."' 38 This expanded approach, the Court
reasoned, is the only way "[t]o give full effect to the State's choice of
this legitimate penological goal [of deterring and incapacitating habitual
offenders] .... In weighing Ewing's prior offenses against the State's
128. Id. at 24-25 (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 (1910); Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 824 (1991); Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998).
129. Id. at 25.
130. Id. (quoting Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 27 (1992)).
131. Id. at 26.
132. Id. at 28.
133. Id. This is the first prong of the Solem three-part test. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292. Although
the plurality and Justice Breyer's concurrence follow the objective test in Justice Kennedy's concur-
rence in Harmelin, the objective factors employed in this analysis are identical to the three-prong test
in Solem. For purposes of this Comment, the author will refer to the framework as the Harmelin
framework.
134. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 29.
137. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 290; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1003-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
138. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29.
139. Id.
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public safety interests, the Court concluded that Ewing's sentence was
not a "rare case" that was grossly disproportionate to the crime. 40 Thus,
because Ewing's sentence failed to reach the initial threshold, the Court
stopped short of conducting an intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional
comparison of three strikes.
Finally, the Court respected the trial judge's decision to not extend
misdemeanant privileges to Ewing under California's "wobbler" provi-
sion.14 1 Justice O'Connor reasoned that one of the purposes behind the
law's allowance of judicial discretion to reduce certain felonies to mis-
demeanors was to avoid imposing harsh penalties on rehabilitated defen-
dants. 142 Justice O'Connor rationalized, however, that given Ewing's
long criminal history, the trial judge properly declined to reduce Ewing's
triggering offense to a misdemeanor and, was justified in concluding that
Ewing did not deserve "lenient treatment."'' 43 By affirming the trial
judge's ruling on Ewing's "wobbler" argument, Justice O'Connor ac-
knowledged the legitimacy of using a "wobbler" as a triggering offense
under three strikes.
To summarize, in its plurality opinion, the Court justified Ewing's
sentence in light of the State's primary goal of ensuring public safety.
Instead of following both Solem and Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
Harmelin and comparing only the gravity of the triggering offense to the
harshness of the penalty, the plurality expanded the threshold test to in-
clude placing Ewing's entire criminal history on the proportionality
scales. Consequently, given Ewing's habitual criminal behavior, the
Court affirmed the California courts' finding that Ewing's sentence did
not violate the Eighth Amendment, and was not "grossly disproportion-
ate" considering his long criminal history.44 While the Court recognized
that, in theory, the Eighth Amendment includes a proportionality princi-
ple for non-capital cases, 145 in practice, the narrow scope of the plural-
ity's balancing test does little to advance the reality of proportionality
concerns in non-capital sentences like Ewing's.
B. Justice Scalia's and Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinions: The
Eighth Amendment Does Not Include a Proportionality Principle for
Non-Capital Cases
Although the plurality followed a "narrow proportionality" stan-
dard, both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, in their separate concurring
opinions, maintained that the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis
140. Id. at 30.
141. See id. at 28-29.
142. See id. at 29.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 30-31.
145. Id. at 20.
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is reserved solely for capital punishment.146 The Justices contended that
the Eighth Amendment applies only to modes of punishment, and not to
the length of a sentence.
47
Specifically, Justice Scalia referred to his concurring opinion in
Harmelin,148 that the "Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and
unusual punishments' ... was not a 'guarantee against disproportionate
sentences.' ,, 49 While recognizing the importance of stare decisis, Justice
Scalia stated that he would accept a "narrow proportionality principle" if
he "could intelligently apply it."50 Justice Scalia acknowledged the diffi-
culty in applying the proportionality principle when courts must "giv[e]
weight to the purpose of California's three strikes law: incapacitation."'
' 5 1
In fact, Justice Scalia suggested that in order to make clear that the Court
is "evaluating policy," the plurality opinion should "read[] into the
Eighth Amendment . . . the unstated proposition that all punishment
should reasonably pursue the multiple purposes of the criminal law."'
' 52
Justice Thomas, in his brief concurrence, agreed with Justice
Scalia's contention that Solem's proportionality test is "incapable of ju-
dicial application."15 3 In keeping with the notion that Solem was "simply
wrong," 154 Justice Thomas stated that "[e]ven were Solem's [objective
factors] test perfectly clear, [he] would not feel compelled by stare de-
cisis to apply it.' 55 Justice Thomas further declared that "the Eighth
Amendment contains no proportionality principle."
156
Thus, although both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas concurred in
the plurality's result, they both denied the necessity of even applying a
proportionality principle to Ewing's non-capital sentence.
146. See id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment).
147. See id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment).
148. Id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia announced the judgment of
the Court in Harmelin and delivered the opinion with respect to Part IV, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter joined. In addition, Justice Scalia
offered an opinion with respect to Parts I, H and I1 of the Harmelin decision, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined. Accordingly, Parts I, II and Il of Justice Scalia's Harmelin opinion are referred to
as "concurring" opinions. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961.




152. Id. at 32 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
153. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
154. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965.
155. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
156. Id.
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C. Justice Stevens's and Justice Breyer's Dissents: The Eighth Amend-
ment Prohibits Excessive Punishments
1. Justice Stevens's Dissent
Unlike the concurring Justices' opinions that proportionality review
is incapable of judicial application to non-capital sentences, Justice Ste-
vens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, reasoned that the
Eighth Amendment "directs judges to exercise their wise judgment in
assessing the proportionality of all forms of punishment." 157 While courts
are often called upon to "'draw... lines in a variety of contexts, '" 58 the
Court has acknowledged the complexity in objectively analyzing the
proportionality of sentences. 159 However, contrary to the plurality's
adoption of a "narrow proportionality principle," Justice Stevens invoked
a "broad proportionality principle."1 60 Accordingly, under Justice Ste-
vens's reasoning, judges should take into account "all of the justifica-
tions for punishment-namely, deterrence, incapacitation, retribution and
rehabilitation," when conducting a proportionality review.
161
2. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Similar to Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ste-
vens, Souter, and Ginsburg, concluded that Ewing fell within the "rare
cases" that warranted a proportionality review. 62 Applying the Harmelin
framework, Justice Breyer initially conducted "a threshold comparison of
the crime committed and the sentence imposed.' 63 To analyze the
harshness of Ewing's sentence, Justice Breyer initiated a comparative
analysis between Ewing's case and Rummel and Solem. 164 Justice Breyer
defined three "sentence-related characteristics" to apply in his compara-
tive analysis: (1) "the length of the prison term in real time;"'165 (2) "the
sentence-triggering criminal conduct;" and (3) "the offender's criminal
157. Id. at 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Stevens notes that the Solem
three-factor test is more on point than Harmelin, since the Solem Court addressed a recidivist sen-
tencing. Id. at 32 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 294). Justice Stevens gives
the examples of "line drawing" in cases involving the Due Process Clause, in which judges are
called upon to assess the constitutionality of punitive damages. Id. Similarly, courts exercise discre-
tion to determine if a delay is unconstitutional, in relation to the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a
speedy trial. Id. at 34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 988-89 (recognizing that it is difficult to objectively define
gravity).
160. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 36-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 37 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
164. Id. Justice Breyer explained that Rummel and Solem were the precedent "most directly in
point," because these cases addressed the "constitutionality of recidivist sentencing." Id.
165. Real time is the time "that the offender is likely actually to spend in prison... Id.
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history."' 166 Under his analysis, Justice Breyer determined that Ewing's
claim fell "within the twilight zone between Solem and Rummel ....
First, in comparing the "offender characteristics" of the three cases,
Justice Breyer concluded that Ewing's four prior convictions did not
differ significantly from Helm's six prior offenses in Solem. 168 Con-
versely, Ewing's four "priors" considerably differed in degree from
Rummel's two prior felony convictions, which involved small amounts
of money. 169 Next, in evaluating the differences in the "offense behavior"
between the three cases, Justice Breyer reasoned that the disparity in the
value of the goods stolen, when examined in relation to inflation, was
marginal at best. 70 Ultimately, for Justice Breyer, the key distinction
between each case rested in the length of real prison time. 171
Justice Breyer reasoned that "Ewing's sentence on its face im-
pos[ed] one of the most severe punishments available upon a recidivist
who subsequently engaged in one of the less serious forms of criminal
conduct."' 172 In comparison, although Helm faced life in prison without
parole,173 Justice Breyer reasoned that Ewing's 25-year-to-life sentence
"is long enough to consume the productive remainder of almost any of-
fender's life.' ' 174 In other words, Ewing's sentence was equally as harsh
as Helm's. Moreover, in Rummel, the Court upheld the sentence, but the
state's recidivist statute allowed parole after ten to twelve years. 175 By
comparing Ewing's circumstances to the factors in Rummel and Solem,
Justice Breyer concluded that Ewing's sentence was severe and, thus,
unconstitutional. 1
76
Beyond the comparative analysis, Justice Breyer also considered
several other factors in making his threshold determination. First, in
looking at the harm caused to the victim or society, the "'magnitude of
the crime,"' and Ewing's "'culpability,"' Justice Breyer reasoned that
Ewing's triggering offense "rank[ed] well toward the bottom of the
criminal conduct scale."'' 77 Second, at the recommendation of the Solici-
tor General, Justice Breyer applied three additional criteria: (1) the fre-
166. Id.
167. Id. at 40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 38-39 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer noted, however, that one of Ewing's
prior offenses did involve the use of a knife, whereas, Helm's priors were all unarmed offenses.
Solem, 463 U.S. at 279-80.
169. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 38-39 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 266.
170. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 39 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer compared the inflation-
adjusted price of the golf clubs to Solem and Rummel: $505 compared to $100 in Solem, or $309
compared to $120.75 in Rummel. Id.
171. Id. at 39-40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
173. Solem, 463 U.S. at 282.
174. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 39 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
175. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 267.
176. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
177. Id. (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. 292-93).
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quency of shoplifting; (2) the simplicity or difficulty of detecting the
crime; and (3) deterrence of the crime by varying degrees of punish-
ment. 7 8 Justice Breyer argued that shoplifting is easy to detect because
of surveillance cameras, as well as the presence of witnesses, such as the
store's employees and customers. 179 Justice Breyer also remained skepti-
cal as to whether enhanced sentences deterred shoplifting. 80 Finally,
although shoplifting occurs frequently, Justice Breyer stressed that "'fre-
quency,' standing alone, cannot make a critical difference."1 8 1 Based on a
comparative analysis and these additional factors, Justice Breyer con-
cluded that Ewing's claim fell within the "rare" occurrences that surpass
the initial "'threshold' test."' 82 Although Justice Breyer applied the plu-
rality's narrow proportionality test and examined Ewing's criminal his-
tory when balancing the gravity of the offense against the harshness of
the penalty, generally Justice Breyer's analysis focused on Ewing's trig-
gering offense 18
3 and his lengthy sentence.
184
Because Ewing's "grossly disproportionate" sentence crossed the
initial threshold, Justice Breyer turned to the next prong of the Harmelin
framework-a comparison of Ewing's sentence to California's sentenc-
ing scheme before the adoption of the three strikes law, and to other ju-
risdictions.1 8' Before the enactment of three strikes, Ewing would have
186
served a maximum of approximately ten years. Recidivists, claimed
Justice Breyer, would have served only a "small fraction of Ewing's real-
time sentence," before the implementation of three strikes.1 87 To illus-
trate the harshness of Ewing's sentence, Justice Breyer indicated that
California reserved 25-year-to-life sentences for "nonrecidivist, first-
degree murderers."' 188 In comparing Ewing's sentence to other jurisdic-
tions, Justice Breyer found that in thirty-three jurisdictions and the fed-
eral courts, "the law would make it legally impossible for a Ewing-type
offender to serve more than 10 years in prison ... ,,"189 In the end, Justice
178. Id. (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 24-25, Ewing v. California,
123 S. Ct. 1179 (2003) (No. 01-6978)).
179. Id.
180. See id.
181. Id. at 40-41(Breyer, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 37 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also presented statistics from the United
States Sentencing Commission, which did not include shoplifting as a trigger crime. Id. at 41-42
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
183. See id. at 35, 40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
184. See id. at 39-40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 42-43 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The plurality did not undertake an intrajurisdictional
and interjurisdictional comparison because it concluded that Ewing's sentence did not pass the
threshold requirement. Id. at 30. Although the plurality and Justice Breyer follow the objective test
from Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Harnelin, the objective factors employed in this analysis are
identical to the three-prong test in Solem. See id. at 37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 43 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 44 (Breyer, J., dissenting). "On average, recidivists served three to four additional..
years in prison, with 90 percent serving less than an additional real seven to eight years." Id.
188. Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 190(a) (2003)).
189. Id. at 45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Breyer reasoned that "[o]utside the California three strikes context, Ew-
ing's ... sentence is virtually unique in its harshness ... by a consider-
able degree." 90
After finding Ewing's sentence extreme under the Harmelin frame-
work, Justice Breyer subsequently considered whether the legislative
intent behind three strikes reasonably justified Ewing's punishment.' 9'
Although the plurality reasoned that three strikes meets California's pur-
ported goals of deterring repeat offenders and preserving public safety,
192
Justice Breyer found no criminal justice rationalization for Ewing's sen-
tence. 193 Instead, he suggested that "California's three strikes statute is a
series of anomalies."' 94 For instance, the variance in the seriousness of
the triggering offenses, the random application of three strikes punish-
ments, and the statute's absence of enumerated applicable triggering of-
fenses, resulted in unacceptable administrative justifications for Ewing's
sentence. 95 Justice Breyer further contended that because the law aims to
reduce serious and violent crime, Ewing's 25-year-to-life sentence for
shoplifting is "overkill."' 196 Therefore, "the State cannot find in its three
strikes law a special criminal justice need sufficient to rescue a sentence
that other relevant considerations indicate is unconstitutional."'
197
Justice Breyer emphasized the importance of applying an analytical
framework on a case by case basis to determine whether a sentence is
proportional to the crime.1 98 Unlike Justice Scalia's and Justice Thomas's
concurring opinions, Justice Breyer reasoned that "a bright-line rule
would give legislators and sentencing judges more guidance."' 99 With
such a rule, courts may more readily recognize that 25-year-to-life sen-
tences like Ewing's are grossly disproportionate to a triggering offense of
stealing three golf clubs. 2°
In short, although the plurality conducted a proportionality analysis
of Ewing's sentence, the narrow principle applied does little to remedy
the gross disparity of sentences prevalent in non-capital, recidivists'
cases. By reiterating the principle that proportionality reviews of non-
capital cases are "exceedingly rare,, 20' the plurality implied that propor-
tionality principles adhere better to death penalty cases. In fact, both Jus-
tice Scalia and Justice Thomas sustained in their concurring opinions that
190. Id. at 47 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
191. See id.
192. Id. at 24-27.
193. Id. at 48 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 49 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
195. See id. at 48-50 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 52 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
197. Id.
198. See id. at 52-53 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 52 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
200. See id. at 52-53 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 21 (citing Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272).
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proportionality principles should only apply to "modes of punishment,"
rather than length of sentences.2°2 Justice Breyer, on the other hand, sug-
gested in his dissent that courts are capable of applying objective factors
and conducting a comparative analysis to determine the proportionality
of non-capital sentences. 20 3 However, given the extremely restrictive
nature of the plurality's balancing test, few cases will ever get past the
initial threshold to warrant an application of Justice Breyer's compara-
tive analysis. As a result, by affirming the constitutionality of Ewing's
sentence, any future successful challenges to three strikes are highly
unlikely.
IV. ANALYSIS
In granting certiorari the Ewing Court had the opportunity to review
the legitimacy of California's three strikes law, and to determine the con-
stitutionality of indeterminate life sentences for recidivists convicted of
non-violent and non-serious crimes. In response, the plurality not only
affirmed the constitutionality of Ewing's sentence, but also upheld the
longstanding view that "[o]utside the context of capital punishment, suc-
cessful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [are]
exceedingly rare.' '204 This Comment argues that by adopting an excep-
tionally narrow balancing test, the plurality failed to address the funda-
mental principle of the "evolving standards of decency, 20 5 engrained in
the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, aside from the plurality's neglect of
the constitutional questions surrounding three strikes, the Court ada-
mantly redirected any future criticism of the law to the state legisla-
ture. 206 Thus, unless California's legislature steps up and accepts an
amended version of three strikes, targeting only serious and violent felo-
nies, California's resources will continue to be pinched by the costs of
this radical law. Even more troubling, other non-violent habitual offend-
ers, like Ewing, will spend the majority of their lives behind bars because
of the cruel effects of an overly-broad law originally aimed at imprison-
ing violent offenders.
A. California's Three Strikes Law is Unconstitutional
In reviewing the constitutionality of Ewing's sentence, the plurality
failed to address an essential factor under the Eighth Amendment-
society's "evolving standards of decency. 20 7 By applying an extremely
"narrow proportionality principle" to non-capital sentences,208 the Court
202. See id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment).
203. See id. at 52-53 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
204. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
205. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 292 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
206. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003).
207. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (quoting Dulles, 356 U.S. at 101).
208. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20.
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significantly circumscribed any future attempts at surpassing the initial
threshold and successfully challenging the constitutionality of three
strikes' mandatory minimum sentences in relation to non-violent offend-
ers.
1. The Ewing Court's Narrow Threshold Test Slams the Door on
Recidivist's Proportionality Claims
To conduct a pertinent objective analysis of excessive sentences,
Justice Breyer maintained that "[a] threshold test must permit arguably
unconstitutional sentences, not only actually unconstitutional sentences,
to pass the threshold .... ,,209 However, the plurality's narrow balancing
test, which requires courts to consider an offender's prior offenses in
weighing the gravity of the current offense against the harshness of the
penalty, produces an insurmountable legal hurdle for recidivists wanting
to bring a constitutional claim.2 10 In fact, the plurality's balancing test
goes beyond being a simple threshold inquiry and, instead, creates a de-
terminative standard. 211 By building a barrier out of a habitual offender's
criminal history and placing it in front of the threshold, the plurality
makes fighting an excessive punishment utterly impossible for recidi-
vists. 212 The most unreasonable effect of the Court's conclusive balanc-
ing test is that it precludes taking into account the "evolving standards of
decency," which is fundamental to any Eighth Amendment objective
analysis.
2. The Plurality Disregarded Any Notion of Human Decency in
Ewing
The Eighth Amendment embodies the idea that maintaining human
dignity is essential to a mature and civilized society.213 In fact, "[t]he
basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the
dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment
stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized
standards. 214 In order to evaluate the "'clearest and most reliable objec-
tive evidence of contemporary values,"' courts must be able to take the
next step in a proportionality analysis and compare similar legislative
215enactments throughout the country.
209. Id. at 42 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
210. See id. (reasoning that any "test that blocked every ultimately invalid constitutional claim
... would not be a threshold test but a determinative test" (emphasis excluded)).
211. See id.
212. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Is Any Sentence Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, TRIAL, May
2003, 78, 78.
213. See Blake v. Hall, 668 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1981).
214. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 100.
215. Brief of Amicus Curiae California Public Defenders Association at 9, Lockyer v.
Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2003) (No. 01-1127) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312
(2002) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989))) [hereinafter CPDA Brief].
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Recently the Court confirmed that "[a] claim that punishment is ex-
cessive is judged ...by [standards] that currently prevail," in today's
216society. Accordingly, if the plurality had conducted the pertinent intra-
jurisdictional and interjurisdictional comparative analysis outlined in
Solem's three-prong test,217 the results would have indicated that no other
state would have given Ewing as harsh a punishment as he received from
California.218 Although the plurality noted the seriousness of Ewing's
grand theft219 when reaching its decision,220 a serious sentence for shop-
lifting three golf clubs still does not warrant 25-years-to-life. In fact,
even in California, the punishment for the non-violent crime of stealing
approximately $1,200 in merchandise is typically one year in a county
jail for first time offenders, 221 and no more than ten years under thirty-
three other recidivist statutes.22 The plurality further justified its decision
by pointing to California's public safety concerns.223 Yet, considering
that Ewing's prior crimes were primarily non-violent property of-
fenses,224 Ewing does not fall into the category of the threatening, violent
offenders Californians intended to reach when they voted for three
strikes.225 Consequently, the plurality's restrictive balancing approach
impedes any chance of defining society's contemporary values and,
therefore, is not in accordance with an individual's fundamental rights
under the Eighth Amendment.
Notwithstanding the plurality's failure to address significant consti-
tutional concerns in its Ewing decision, in the end, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of three strikes, and the law's effects of sending non-
violent offenders to prison for life. In fact, the Court all but foreclosed
any future judicial challenges to three strikes and left any revision of the
statute to "the legislatures, not ... the federal courts."226 Therefore, any
hope of mitigating the harshness of the controversial recidivist statute
now rests with California's legislative process.
216. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311 (reasoning that determining the excessiveness of a crime should
not be judged by the standards that "prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over the 'Bloody
Assizes' or when the Bill of Rights was adopted").
217. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).
218. CPDA Brief, supra note 215, at 9.
219. Shoplifting nearly $1,200 worth of merchandise is considered felony grand theft and is a
"wobbler." CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 487(a) (West 2003).
220. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28.
221. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 489 (West 2003).
222. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 24-26.
224. Id. at 19. However, one of Ewing's prior offenses involved a knife. Id.
225. See generally Amend 3 Strikes, Understand the Problem and the Solution, at
http://amend3strikes.com/problemsolution.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter Problem and
Solution]; see also generally CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET, GEN. ELEcTION 5 (Nov. 8, 1994), available
at http://holmes.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/1994g.pdf (last visited April 21, 2004)).
226. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284.
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B. Leave the Reform of Three Strikes to the Legislature
Even though opponents of three strikes are still feeling the sting
from the Court's decision, they have not stopped fighting.227 In response
to the Court's ruling, activists in the three-strikes reform movement have
refocused and placed modification of the three strikes law back in the
hands of California's legislature.228
1. Is Legislative Reform Possible?
Courts generally defer statutory reform to state legislatures, but
California's government seems reluctant to make changes to the three
strikes law. According to the statute's provisions, the law can only be
amended by a supermajority. 229 However, in January 2003 State Assem-
blywoman Jackie Goldberg introduced Assembly Bill 112, which pro-
posed to put a modified version of three strikes before voters in 2004,
and would only need a majority to pass in the legislature.23° Specifically,
the amendment would limit the law's application to repeat violent and
serious felons. 231 Additionally, the bill would give already convicted
third-strike felons the opportunity to have their sentences reviewed and
possibly reduced. 232 Although two-thirds of Californians say they would
support the initiative, negative sentiment against the proposed modifi-
cation is equally evident.
234
In response to the proposed bill, proponents of three strikes contend
that an amendment of the law is "part of liberal Democrats' 'criminal-
friendly agenda' that 'could threaten public safety by releasing danger-
ous criminals back into society.'' 235 Three strikes supporters further ar-
gue that adopting Goldberg's bill would give California an unwanted
"soft-on-crime" image. 236 In fact, newly-elected Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger, adamantly opposes any modification to the three strikes
law, and probably will veto Assembly Bill 112 if it passes a legislative
227. See generally Dana Parsons, 3 Strikes Opponent Still in the Game, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7,
2003, at B3 (recognizing the optimism of three strikes opponents, despite the Courts recent ruling).
228. Id.
229. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6670) (West 2003).
230. See Assembly Bill 112, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003), available at
http://www.cdaa.org/abl12introduced.pdf (last visited May. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Assembly Bill
112].
231. Id. Currently, every other state that has three strike laws requires that the triggering of-
fense be a serious or violent crime. See Erwin Chemerinsky, 3 Strikes: Cruel, Unusual and Unfair,
AMEND THREE STRIKES Now, Mar. 10, 2003, at http://www.amend3strikes.com/_supreme
_court/sc006.htm (lastvisited Nov. 2, 2003).
232. See Parsons, supra note 227, at B3.
233. Id.
234. Voters Should Get to Pass Judgment on Three-Strikes Law, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Mar. 17, 2003, at 6B, available at http://amend3strikes.com/_news/031703.htm (last visited Nov. 3,
2003) [hereinafter Pass Judgment].
235. Id. (quoting Republican Assembly Leader Dave Cox).
236. Id.
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vote. 237 Hence, any legislative efforts at revising three strikes likely will
face considerable resistance.238 Yet, in analyzing some of the social and
economic weaknesses of three strikes, the need for reform of the law
becomes even more evident.
2. The Misleading Social Ramifications of the Three Strikes Law
The minor results seen from the three strikes law thus far support
the notion that the law is doing everything but cracking down on violent
crime and, therefore, it must be changed. In Ewing, the plurality at-
tempted to validate the three strikes law by relying on the 1998 Attorney
General's study, which credited the law with significantly reducing Cali-
fornia's crime.239 However, comparable studies show that three strikes
was not the only catalyst to the State's reduction in crime.24 °
According to studies performed after the enactment of three strikes,
the overly-broad statute has barely put a dent in California's violent
crime rate.2 41 First, scholars suggest that California's prosperous labor
market positively impacted the crime rate.242 Specifically, both the un-
employment rate and crime rate moved in the same direction during the
first six years after the adoption of three strikes pointing to alternative
reasons for the State's reduction in crime.24 3 Second, studies indicate that
crime rates dropped faster in the California counties that only applied
three strikes law to serious and violent offenses than in counties where
prosecutors broadly applied the law to any felony.2 " In particular, crime
decreased "21.3% in the six counties that have been the most lenient in
enforcing three strikes, while the toughest counties experienced only a
12.7% drop in their crime rates. 2 45
237. See Join Arnold!, Arnold's Views on Crime, at http://www.joinamold.com/en/agenda/
arnoldsviews.php (last visited May 17, 2004).
238. See Pass Judgment, supra note 234, at 6B. Assembly Bill 112 was in an inactive file in
Sacramento at the time of writing this paper. E-mail from Jim Benson, Vice Chairman, Citizens
Against Violent Crime, to Sara J. Lewis (Oct. 11, 2003, 13:33:29 EDT) (on file with author). As-
semblywoman Goldberg can put the bill up for a vote at any time during this session, which ends
later in 2004. Id. However, supporters of the amended law are skeptical that the bill will pass and
subsequently receive Governor Schwarzenegger's signature. Id.
239. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 27 (citing Office of the Atty. Gen., Cal. Dep't. of J., Three Strikes and
You're Out: Its Impact on the California Criminal Justice System After Four Years, 10 (1998)).
240. See Beres & Griffith, supra note 41, at 108.
241. Findings from the California Department of Justice's Criminal Justice Statistics Center
could not verify any "valid evaluations" of the State's "get tough" laws that conclude three strikes
has a direct effect on crime rates. Ryan S. King & Marc Mauer, The Sentencing Project, Aging
Behind Bars: "Three Strikes" Seven Years Later 7 (2001), at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/
9087.pdf (last visited May 17, 2004).
242. See Beres & Griffith, supra note 41, at 108.
243. Id.
244. Mike Males et al., Striking Out: The Failure of California's "Three Strikes and You're
Out Law," JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, Mar. 16, 1999, available at http://www.justicepolicy.
org/article.php?id=260 (last visited May 17, 2004).
245. Michael Vitiello, Punishment and Democracy: A Hard Look at Three Strikes' Overblown
Promises, 90 CAL. L. REV. 257, 270 (2002) (citing Jon Hill, Crime Stats Capture Both Arguments,
CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Feb. 3, 2000, at Al).
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Probably the best evidence showing that three strikes has not sig-
nificantly contributed to the drop in California's crime rate comes from
an analysis conducted by The Sentencing Project in 2000.246 This study
of states' crime rates concluded that "substantial increases in incarcera-
tion did not necessarily translate into significant declines in [Califor-
nia's] crime., 247 To illustrate the discrepancy, although crime rates de-
creased by thirty-six percent in California from 1991-1998 as incarcera-
tion increased by fifty-two percent, in the previous period, 1984-1991,
crime rates increased by five percent despite a ninety-six percent increase
in imprisonment. 248 Thus, this study demonstrates that three strikes, de-
signed to imprison more habitual offenders as a means to deter crime,
exhibited no independent effect on California's crime rate.
Finally, in measuring the incapacitating effect of three strikes, op-
ponents emphasize that any positive impact on the crime rate will not be
known until the offenders begin serving the increased portion of their
sentences. 249 As a result, current California crime rates are misleading,
and should not be used by three strikes supporters as evidence for the
law's success. In addition to the ambiguous social ramifications of three
strikes, the clearest projected consequence of the law is the pressure it
will place on California's economy.
3. The Long-Term Economic Effects of Three Strikes
By passing reform of three strikes to the legislature, California must
continue to address the noticeable financial strains resulting from flood-
ing California's prisons with non-violent repeat offenders. 250 Assembly-
woman Goldberg estimates that it costs $27,000 a year to house each
25inmate. 51 Undoubtedly, after the Court's adoption of a restrictive
proportionality standard, repeat non-violent offenders will continue to
face long-term sentences and further crowd the State's prisons.252
246. See generally Jenni Gainsborough & Marc Mauer, The Sentencing Project, Diminishing
Returns: Crime and Incarceration in the 1990s (2000), at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/
9039.pdf (last visited May 17, 2004).
247. King & Mauer, supra note 241, at 8 (citing Gainsborough & Mauer, supra note 246).
248. See Gainsborough & Mauer, supra note 246, at 10, 14.
249. See Vitiello, supra note 245, at 268.
250. Approximately 7,000 convicted habitual offenders have been sentenced to at least 25
years to life under California's three strikes law, and more than half of those received their sentence
for a non-violent crime. Kristina Horton-Flaherty, Court Rulings, Public Opinion Chip Away at
'Three Strikes,' CAL. B.J., Mar. 2002, available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/2cbj/02mar/
page l-l.htm (last visited May 17, 2004).
251. Parsons, supra note 227, at B3.
252. As mentioned, by requiring courts to weigh an offender's entire criminal history in the
proportionality balancing test, the Court basically makes proportionality challenges against three
strikes sentences virtually impossible. See supra Part IV.A and accompanying text. In essence, the
standard produces a chain reaction. By upholding the constitutionality of Ewing's sentence under the
plurality's restrictive test, other non-violent third-strike offenders will likely forego challenging the
proportionality of their sentences and, therefore, wind up in California's prisons serving their man-
datory term of at least 25 years. At $27,000 a year per inmate, not including inflation or costs related
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Although proponents of the law claim the penal system can handle
the increased number of inmates, the estimated costs of three strikes on
California's prison system are staggering.253 Critics of three strikes,
claim the effect on the prison system is "a crisis deferred, one for which
Californians will pay dearly ...on the installment plan. 254 In fact,
"160,000 inmates are crowded into prisons designed for 80,000.,"255 Even
more troubling is the additional cost to taxpayers. When Californians
cast their votes in favor of three strikes, they implicitly approved using
more of their tax dollars to deter violent crimes.256 Yet what Californians
got in return was a law that costs taxpayers "more than $500 million per
year," to house non-violent recidivists.257 An estimate by The Sentencing
Project puts the bill for accommodating three strikes inmates at $750
million annually by 2026.258 Therefore, while the California legislature
should consider the social propriety of three strikes, the legislature must
also undoubtedly seriously consider the fiscal impact of the statute, and
recognize that reformation of the law is economically inevitable.
CONCLUSION
In 1994, in the heat of the distressing murder of twelve-year-old
Polly Klaas, California's legislature sold three strikes to voters as a law
that would lock up repeat violent criminals and put an end to these hei-
nous crimes.259 Instead, when Californian's went to the ballot box that
November they chose a law made up of extreme variables and a "one-
size-fits-all mandatory minimum sentencing scheme [for] minor
crimes.,,260 The foreseeable depletion of California's resources resulting
from this deluded legislation calls for the immediate reform of three
strikes law. Accordingly, change must begin by returning to the voters'
original intentions-to deter violent crime.
Given the strong policy arguments for revising the law, legislators,
the governor, and California's voters should amend three strikes to only
apply to violent and serious felonies.261 First, by adopting a narrower
to medical needs of older prisoners, a third strike offender will cost the prison system at least
$675,000 by the end of serving the minimum 25-year sentence. See Parsons, supra note 227, at B3.
253. Vitiello, supra note 245, at 279-80.
254. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
255. See Problem and Solution, supra note 225.
256. See King & Mauer, supra note 241, at 3. Some of the laws "staunchest supporters" as-
serted that the law was designed to isolate and punish the most serious, habitual offenders. Id.
257. See Problem and Solution, supra note 225.
258. See King & Mauer, supra note 241, at 5.
259. See Parsons, supra note 227, at B3.
260. Brief of Amicus Curiae Families Against Mandatory Minimums at 3, Ewing v. California,
123 S. Ct. 1179 (2003) (No. 01-6978). To illustrate, in a sample of more than 1,300 cases, burglary
or drug offenses are twice as likely to receive a mandatory 25-year-to-life sentence under three
strikes than are all of the violent offenses in California's penal code combined. See ZIMRING ET AL.,
supra note 25, at 50.
261. This proposed amendment is similar to Assembly Bill 112 proposed by Assemblywoman
Goldberg's. See Assembly Bill 112, supra note 230.
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law, courts will not have to weigh down the proportionality scale with
prior violent acts in order to prove that the punishment fits the crime. z62
Simply put, the gravity of a violent and serious triggering offense, will fit
the harshness of the penalty, and likely will do away with proportionality
concerns. Similarly, by ceasing the disproportionate punishment of non-
violent offenders, courts will adhere to the "evolving standards of de-
cency" set forth in the Eighth Amendment, and implicit in other recidi-
vist statutes throughout the nation. Finally, as part of an amended version
of the law, the highly discretionary "wobbler" offenses should not be
allowed to constitute third strikes. Instead, the new law should adhere to
the defined violent and serious offenses and likewise permit eligibility
for three strikes only after an offender commits a third truly violent or
serious crime. Ultimately, with the passage of a narrower law, the consti-
tutionality of three strikes likely would be moot.
In addition to alleviating any constitutional concerns, California's
projected economic problems and social inconsistencies resulting from
three strikes will dissolve. First, as proposed by Assemblywoman Gold-
berg, already convicted third-strike offenders should have the opportu-
nity to have their convictions reviewed and possibly reduced. 263 By al-
lowing a retroactive application of the new law, the overcrowding cur-
rently present in California's prisons will eventually subside with each
reduced sentence. Finally, if California's penal system moves away from
incarcerating petty thieves for up to twenty-five years, the costs saved by
the State will be colossal.z6
While the problems associated with three strikes are overwhelming,
the solution is simple-change the law. If California's legislature steps
up and passes a revised version of three strikes targeting violent offend-
ers, California's prisons will no longer be bursting at the seams with mi-
nor third-strikers. More importantly, California's resources can go to
265.more important social necessities, like higher education, instead of tohousing the golf club thieves of today's society.
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262. See ACLU of Southern California, What's at Stake: Three Strikes Reform, at
http://ga1.org/campaign/abI 12/explanation (last visited May 17, 2004).
263. See Parsons, supra note 227, at B3.
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